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Revisited: Return of the Median Voter∗
Nobuyuki Hanaki† Emily Tanimura‡ Nicolaas J. Vriend§
April 4, 2016
Abstract
We study a linear location model (Hotelling, 1929) in which n (with
n ≥ 2) boundedly rational players follow (noisy) myopic best-reply behavior.
We show through numerical and mathematical analysis that such players
spend almost all the time clustered together near the center, re-establishing
the “Principle of Minimum Differentiation” that had been discredited by
equilibrium analyses. Thus, our analysis of the best-response dynamics shows
that when considering market dynamics as well as their policy and welfare
implications, it may be important to look beyond equilibrium analyses.
JEL Classification: C72, D72, L13, R30
Keywords: Hotelling location model, Principle of Minimum Differentiation,
Nash equilibrium, Best-response dynamics, Stochastic stability, Invariant
measures
1 Introduction
Hotelling (1929) showed in a linear location model, in which two players
independently choose a location, with their payoffs depending on the distance from
individuals distributed on the line, that both players will locate together in the
center. This result led to the notion of the “Principle of Minimum Differentiation”.
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Hotelling’s model, where individuals have preferences over locations, provided
a theoretical explanation for some casual observations that he reported about a
widespread tendency for decision makers to choose only slight deviations from each
other’s location in the most diverse fields of competitive activity, even quite apart,
as he put it, from what is typically called economic life. Besides geographical
locations, he also discussed locations in product characteristics space, mentioning
a “tremendous standardization of our furniture, our houses, our clothing, our
automobiles and our education” (p. 54), as well as the choice of platforms by political
parties in policy space.
Building on Hotelling’s results, Black (1948) and Downs (1957) established the
“Median Voter Theorem”, i.e., that a plurality voting rule will select the outcome
preferred by the median voter. Also related is “Duverger’s Law” (Duverger, 1954),
which suggests that with plurality voting, one should expect a two-party system.
This has given rise to an extensive empirical and theoretical literature (see e.g. Riker
(1982), Rowley (1984), Osborne (1995), Grofman (2004), and many others). In this
paper, we will go back to Hotelling (1929), and focus on one single aspect of this
literature: The Principle of Minimum Differentiation.
Hotelling’s result that in equilibrium the players will locate together in the center
turns out to be correct for the special case of n = 2 players. As we will briefly sketch
in Section 2, equilibrium analyses have made clear that the Principle of Minimum
Differentiation is not robust to changing the number of players n in the basic location
model to any number n > 2. In fact, for any n > 2, the Nash equilibria look almost
the opposite of what is described by the Principle of Minimum Differentiation, with
all players spread out relatively evenly, leaving only the extreme fringes unoccupied,
as the most extreme players will be tugging in with their neighbors, and strict
bounds on the spatial differences between the players.
Experimental evidence for Hotelling’s location game in the laboratory with n = 3
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(Collins and Sherstyuk, 2000) and n = 4 (Huck, Mu¨ller, and Vriend, 2002) suggests
that one may expect many non-equilibrium outcomes in this game, with in particular
more choices near the center than predicted by the theory.1
Given the apparently widespread centripetal tendency of decision makers in a
range of different settings, as argued e.g. by Hotelling (1929), typically also in cases
where there are more than two decision makers, and given also the experimental
evidence for the basic Hotelling game, the game-theoretic analysis of the basic
location game raises the important question as to how one may explain such a
centripetal tendency. In the industrial organization literature, Palma, Ginsburgh,
Papageorgiou, and Thisse (1985) showed that one way to restore the Principle is
to assume that there is sufficient heterogeneity in consumers’ tastes combined with
uncertainty by the firms about these preferences. Another approach is to consider a
different equilibrium concept. Shino and Kawasaki (2012) characterize the farsighted
stable set of the Hotelling game, and show that this set contains location profiles
that reflect the minimum differentiation.
In this paper, we will follow an alternative approach. Instead of an equilibrium
analysis, we will analyze the behavior of myopic best-response dynamics. We will
show, through numerical as well as formal, mathematical analysis, that the players
will be located almost all the time close to the center if their location choices are
governed by noisy, myopic best-responses to the other players. We show for n ≥ 3
that players spend significantly much more time in locations that are closer to the
center (and close to each other) than predicted by the Nash equilibria. What is
more, we show that by refining the discrete space (thus approximating a continuous
space), we can get the players located arbitrarily close to the center almost all the
time, catering essentially just to the median voter.
Thus, while the Principle of Minimum Differentiation is consistent with Nash
1See also Brown-Kruse, Cronshaw, and Schenk (1993) and Brown-Kruse and Schenk (2000) for
related duopoly experiments.
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equilibrium behavior only for n = 2, to the extent that there may be a tendency
for decision makers to choose (noisy) myopic best-responses, our analysis suggests a
possible explanation as to why this popular notion is so ubiquitous, acquiring almost
“folk wisdom” status, as well as for the empirical evidence this is based on.
Providing a possible explanation for some empirical phenomenon is not the only
reason why our analysis may be interesting. That best-response dynamics may
lead to outcomes that are so different from the Nash equilibrium analyses seems an
intriguing feature of the Hotelling game from a theoretical point of view, and relates
to the literature on best-response dynamics and Nash equilibria. See, e.g., Hofbauer
(1995), Hopkins (1999), and Balkenborg, Hofbauer, and Kuzmics (2013).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
Hotelling location model as well as a brief overview of the equilibrium analysis.
Section 3 presents our numerical analysis, to gain some insight into the behavior of
best-response dynamics in our model. We, then, formally characterize the long-run
behavior for the case of n = 3 in Section 4, followed by the case of n = 4 in Section 5.
Section 6 presents some concluding remarks.
2 Equilibrium and minimum differentiation
In this section, we will give a brief overview of the various equilibria found in
Hotelling’s location game. We focus our attention on a basic, linear location model,
which we will present for convenience as a model of spatial voting where the players
are parties who choose a platform x in a one-dimensional, continuous policy space
(normalized to [0, 1]). Following Eaton and Lipsey (1975), assume that no two
parties can choose exactly the same location, with the minimum distance being δ
(with δ close to 0). An infinite number of voters with unit mass, whose preferences
are distributed uniformly over this space, vote for the player who are closest to their
4
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.37
preferred location.2 The spatial distribution of voters is known to the players.
The payoff for a player from choosing location x is simply the share of votes
received at that location. Therefore, if the two nearest players to the left and to the
right are located in L(x) and R(x) respectively, with L(x) < x < R(x), the payoff
of choosing location x is given by:
pi
(
x|L(x), R(x)
)
=

R(x)−L(x)
2
if 0 ≤ L(x) < R(x) ≤ 1(
x+ R(x)−x
2
)
if no player to the left of x and R(x) ≤ 1(
1− x+ x−L(x)
2
)
if 0 ≤ L(x) and no player to the right of x
Eaton and Lipsey (1975) characterized pure strategy Nash equilibria for games
with any number of players but three. If n = 2, the unique Nash equilibrium is when
both players locate at x = 1
2
, giving a payoff pi = 1
2
, as any other location would
imply a lower payoff. For n = 3 there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Any
of the peripheral players will want to move in towards the interior player as much as
possible, but that interior player will always want to jump out of this squeeze. We
will turn our attention to mixed strategy equilibria in a moment, but first we will
consider equilibria in pure strategies for n > 3. For n = 4, the Nash equilibrium
configuration has two players located at 1
4
and the other two at 3
4
. Each player will
get a payoff of 1
4
. When n = 5, there will be three locations that will be occupied
in equilibrium: one in the center (occupied by one player), and two peripheral ones
equally distanced from the center, located at 1
6
and 5
6
respectively, and each occupied
by two players. Note that this means that the interior player will get a payoff of 1
3
,
whereas the four peripheral players will each get a payoff of 1
6
.
Eaton and Lipsey show that there is multiplicity of equilibria when there are
more than 5 players (for any n > 5). For n = 6, one equilibrium configuration
2When a voter finds that the best option to the left and the best option to the right are equally
distant, they choose by a fair coin toss.
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involves three locations, with 1
6
, 3
6
and 5
6
each occupied by two players, and each
of them getting a payoff of 1
6
. An alternative equilibrium configuration involves the
four locations 1
8
, 3
8
, 5
8
and 7
8
, where the two peripheral locations are occupied by two
players and the two interior ones by one player each. In this case the two interior
players will get a payoff of 1
4
and the four peripheral ones a payoff of 1
8
. Between
these two equilibria there is an infinite number of additional equilibria. Think of the
second equilibrium as a stretched version of the first one. As the interval between the
two peripheral locations gets gradually stretched, for any distance one can compute
the required distance for the interior players such that no player has an incentive to
deviate. The same logic, and hence multiplicity of equilibria, applies for any n > 6.
Eaton and Lipsey present an informal proposition (for any n ≥ 6) computing
the bounds for the locations of the peripheral pairs of players, as well as for the vote
shares of each of the players as a function of n. The upper bound for the distance
from the boundary of the space to the leftmost (or rightmost) player is 1
n
. If the
space left at the extreme by the peripheral player were greater than that, this player
would get a payoff greater than 1
n
, and hence the average payoff of the other players
must be strictly less than 1
n
, which means that at least one of them could profitably
deviate to this space left by the peripheral player and get a payoff of at least 1
n
.
Thus, in any equilibrium the distance between the leftmost and rightmost player
will be at least n−1
n
, which will approach 1 as n increases. Within this range the
players must be spread relatively evenly. Towards the two boundaries there must
be a pair of peripheral players, as the outermost players always have an incentive to
move towards their neighbours as far as possible. Interior players may be located
either individually or in pairs. If they appear as a pair their distance will be δ,
but otherwise the upper bound for the intervals between players will be 2
n
. What is
more, in equilibrium no player can get more votes than twice the number of votes
for any of the other players.
6
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We now consider mixed strategy Nash equilibria. Although no pure strategy
equilibrium exists for n = 3, there is a doubly symmetric mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium characterized by Shaked (1982): All players choose locations x such
that 1
4
≤ x ≤ 3
4
with equal probabilities. Ewerhart (2014) characterized the set
of mixed Nash equilibria for n ≥ 4, showing that as n increases this leads to a
more dispersed distribution of individual locations. The distributions are sharply
M-shaped, with most weight at locations at the periphery of the support interval.
The support increases as n increases, and for the reported values of n exceeds that of
the maximum distance between leftmost and rightmost players in the corresponding
pure strategy Nash equilibria.
We can summarize these findings by noting that for any n > 2 the equilibrium
analyses seem to discredit the Principle of Minimum Differentiation as the locations
chosen in the Nash equilibria are spread out considerably.
Another noteworthy characteristic coming out of the equilibrium analysis is the
generic multiplicity of Nash equilibria (for any n > 5 in pure strategies, and any
n > 3 if we consider mixed strategies too). Besides this multiplicity of equilibria,
another characteristic of these Nash equilibria, to which we will return in our analyis
of the best-response dynamics, is that all these Nash equilibria are weak. While this
is trivially true for any mixed Nash equilibrium, it is also the case in the pure
strategy equilibria for any n > 3, where there are always some players who could
deviate from an equilibrium location to any two locations that are between two other
players without loss of payoffs.
Besides varying the number of players n, a number of alternative variations of
the basic model and their effect on the equilibrium predictions have been considered
in the literature. For example, Eaton and Lipsey (1975) consider one-dimensional
spaces without bounds, or two-dimensional spaces, showing that the Principle of
Minimum Differentiation will normally not hold. Apart from considering other
7
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spatial dimensions, equilibrium locations may contradict the Principle also when
extending the basic Hotelling game in other dimensions. For example, in industrial
organization, (d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse, 1979) show that in a two-
stage game where two firms choose their locations in the first stage, and then
compete in terms of prices in the second stage, when the cost of transportation is
quadratic for consumers, firms will locate in the opposite ends of the line to soften
the competition in terms of prices.3 Irmen and Thisse (1998) consider product
differentiation in a multi-characteristics space, and show that firms will choose to
maximize differentiation in some dominant (salient) characteristic while minimizing
differentiation in the others. Similarly, in political economy, the Principle may
not apply if political parties care not only about winning elections but are also
ideologically motivated, i.e., they care about the policy actually implemented. Even
with only two parties, in equilibrium we may see diverging platforms if there is
sufficient uncertainty about the location of the median voter (Drouvelis, Saporiti,
and Vriend, 2014).
3 Best-response dynamics: numerical analysis
Before turning to the formal, mathematical analysis of the behavior of best-response
dynamics in the Hotelling model in sections 4 and 5, where we characterize the
invariant distribution of the players in the long run, in this section we will present
a numerical analysis of the dynamics of the system.
For the remainder of the paper we will focus on a slight variation of the basic,
linear location model sketched in section 2. Instead of a continuous strategy space,
we will consider a discrete space. We discretize the interval [0, 1] into 2M+1 equally
3Matsumura, Matsushima, and Yamanori (2010) analyze the consequences of the evolutionary
dynamics of two firms competing in the setting of d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979),
and show that such dynamics restore the minimum differentiation in that, under the unique
stochastically stable equilibrium, the two firms will locate in the center and set their prices equal
to their marginal costs.
8
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spaced locations x ∈ {0, 1, ..,M − 1,M,M + 1, ..., 2M}, where x = 0 and x = 2M
correspond to the two boundaries, 0 and 1 respectively, and x = M is the median.
Higher values of M correspond to a finer discretization of the space.4 As before,
the spatial distribution of voters (uniform with full support) is known to all players,
and it will stay constant.
Each player can only occupy one of these discretized locations at any point in
time. But any location x can be selected by any of the players simultaneously.5
As the payoff for a player from choosing location x is simply the number of votes
received at that location, when the number of players in location x is nx, and two
nearest players to the left and to the right are located in L(x) and R(x) respectively,
with L(x) < x < R(x), the payoff of choosing location x is given by:
pi
(
x|nx, L(x), R(x)
)
=

1
nx
R(x)−L(x)
2
if 0 ≤ L(x) < R(x) ≤ 1
1
nx
(
x+ R(x)−x
2
)
if no player to the left of x and R(x) ≤ 1
1
nx
(
1− x+ x−L(x)
2
)
if 0 ≤ L(x) and no player to the right of x
The discreteness of the space and the opportunity for more than one player to
select the same location induce some slight changes to the equilibria sketched in
section 2, but the main qualitative features, with all Nash equilibria for any n > 2
looking strongly at odds with the Principle of Minimum Differentiation, are not
affected. We will report on the dynamics for values of M ∈ {1500, 15, 000, 150, 000},
and values of n ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}.6
4Note that this implies that the number of locations will be odd, ensuring that the space has a
median, location M , that can actually be chosen by the players. Results for the numerical analysis
of the best-response dynamics for even numbers of locations are available from the authors upon
request.
5As before, when a voter finds that the best option(s) to the left and the best option(s) to the
right are equally distant, they choose between going left or right by a fair coin toss. If, then, there
is more than one player at location x, votes will be equally divided among the players located
there.
6We chose the values of M so that the number of intervals will be a multiple of 60,
accommodating many of the Nash equilibria in the discretized system for the numbers of players
n that we consider. Of course, as noted already, in a continuous strategy space there is an infinite
9
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In each period, all players simultaneously decide where to locate themselves,
except in the very first period when they are all located randomly. We consider
noisy myopic best-replies. Each player chooses a myopic best-reply with probability
1 − , and chooses a location uniformly randomly with probability . We report
the results for  = 0.001. When myopically best-replying, each player takes the
positions of the other players in the previous period as given and selects a position
that maximizes his payoff. When there are multiple such locations, one of them will
be chosen (uniform) randomly.7
Best-response dynamics are related to a broad class of learning dynamics and
evolutionary dynamics (see, e.g., Hopkins, 1999). The underlying idea of considering
such a plausible class of dynamics is to shed some light on the question as to whether
one should expect (boundedly rational) players to play a Nash equilibrium. If best-
response dynamics converge, it can only be at a strict Nash equilibrium. But if they
exhibit endless cycling, one question to consider will be where the system spends
most of the time.
As we saw above, for any n > 3 the location game is characterized by a
multiplicity of equilibria, and all these Nash equilibria are weak, as there are
always some players who are indifferent between their equilibrium locations and
some alternative locations. As players choose randomly among their best-replies,
for any equilibrium there may be some individual players who move out of their
equilibrium location, rendering these equilibria unstable as other players may be
number of Nash equilibria for any n > 5, and thus any discretization will be able to relate to only
a subset of these. The minor effect of the discreteness of the strategy space is illustrated e.g. in
Huck, Mu¨ller, and Vriend (2002), where we see that with n = 4 in equilibrium the paired players
may stay either in the same location or in two neighboring ones. Results for the analysis of the
dynamics for different values of M and n are available from the authors upon request.
7We also considered a version with inertia, in which players for whom the current location
is part of their best-response correspondence will stay put, and a version with a preference for
near-by locations, in which, in case of indifference, the location closest to the current location will
be chosen. Note that these versions rely on additional specific assumptions about moving costs.
Instead of simultaneous moves we also considered a version with sequential moves, where in each
period one randomly chosen player decides where to locate himself. Results for these variants are
available from the authors upon request.
10
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affected. In addition to this effect of the equilibria being weak, the best-response
dynamics that we consider are characterized by a small amount of noise. This
prevents the system getting stuck in simple periodic trajectories.8 Moreover, the
presence of noise ensures that the location dynamics will be an ergodic Markov
chain. It is then well known that their long run behavior will be described by an
invariant distribution on the states that is reached regardless of the initial conditions
of the system.
The question, then, is what outcomes one should expect in these simple linear
location models when players follow a noisy myopic best-reply. Although one should
not expect perfect convergence to a weak Nash equilibrium, one possible outcome
would be that they spend most of the time near or approximating Nash equilibrium
locations.
Before we will turn to an examination of some statistics of the system later in
this section, we start our numerical analysis with a relatively close-up look at a
number of representative runs of the model, examining how individual players move
around from period to period. This will also provide some insights that may be
helpful in our formal, mathematical analysis in sections 4 and 5.
Figure 1 shows some representative snapshots of locations chosen by all n players
over a 1000 period interval for M = 1500, and n = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, with  = 0.001.
Each location chosen by each player in each period is represented by a dot. The
1000 periods were taken after 10, 000, 000 periods had passed from the beginning
of each run to reduce the possible effects of the initial, random allocations. Time
is shown on the horizontal axis, while the vertical axis shows the locations. The
left-hand side column shows the 1000 locations near the center for the graphs for
n = 3, 4, 6 and 8, while the right-hand side column shows the same runs, but now
with the vertical axis zoomed into the most relevant parts of the strategy space for
8It is also effective in the variant with inertia (where players stay put in case of indifference).
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each graph to optimize the display of the locations.
Figure 1 reveals some interesting features. For n = 3, the players are basically
staying within a small set of locations around the center. For n ≥ 4, we can see
more clearly how the dynamics are dominated by waves of outward expansion of
two clusters of players that are equally distanced from the center and located in the
opposite sides of the center, alternated with waves of single clusters slowly moving
inward to the center. While riding the outward waves, when it comes to choosing a
best-response all players are indifferent between these two clusters, as long as there
is at least one other player in their current cluster. As a result, the numbers involved
within each of the clusters may vary from period to period, and at some point it will
happen that all the players locate themselves in the same cluster, and hence in the
same half of the strategy space. The single cluster, then, starts moving step-by-step
towards the center.9 Once the cluster reaches the center, there are two possibilities.
Either all players stay together, moving to either M−1 or to M+1 before returning
to M . Or the cluster splits into two, with some players moving to M − 1 and some
others to M + 1, followed by a step-by-step outwards movement of both clusters,
with varying memberships, until all players happen to choose the same side of the
strategy space again. To start these waves all that is needed is that all players are
located in the same half of the strategy space.10
Note that in none of the snapshots do we see convergence to the corresponding
Nash equilibrium. Instead, we tend to see the wrong clustering at the wrong
locations and moving into the wrong direction. At first sight, the most likely
candidate to be reached by best-response dynamics is the Nash equilibrium for the
case of n = 4, as it consists of exactly two clusters of two players at locations M
2
and 3M
2
. Taking a closer look at this case provides an interesting illustration for the
9Note that during their move to the center at every step all players select the same location.
That is, there is minimum differentiation even when they are still on their way to the center.
10This takes, depending on n, typically only a few periods from a random initial allocation.
12
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Figure 1: Locations over 1000 period interval for M = 1500, n = 3, 4, 6, 8, with
 = 0.001
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general lack of convergence to equilibrium. Note that, for any n, the farthest the
outward-moving waves can reach is a distance M
2
from the center, as the clusters
are shattered at that point because players prefer to move to anywhere between
the two clusters rather than continue their outward movement. Thus, if this Nash
equilibrium were reached, it may be shattered immediately. But as Figure 1 shows,
the outward-moving clusters may disintegrate already long before the equilibrium
locations are reached. For other values of n the dynamics look similar, but on top
of that the Nash equilibrium configurations are not characterized by two clusters.
What is more, for any n > 4 the Nash equilibria require some players to move beyond
the points where clusters would stop moving outwards and start disintegrating with
some players moving back inwards.
Next, what about the long-run properties in terms of the average distances of
players from the center for various n? How do they vary when we increase the
number of locations, i.e, when we increase M? To answer such questions, we
now turn to some statistics of these best-response dynamics, moving beyond these
representative runs.
We analyze the myopic best-replies for 11 × T periods where T = 10, 000, 000.
We drop, again, the data from the first T periods to reduce the possible effects of
the initial, random allocations, and keep the outcomes from the remaining 10 × T
periods. For a given run, for each period we compute the average distance of the n
players from the center, and we then check for that run the distances from the center
below which this average distance is found 90%, 95% and 99% of the 100 million
periods. Table 1 reports these distances for n = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 or 8 and for M = 1500,
15, 000 and 150, 000, and with  = 0.001 throughout. The reported mean distances
(with the standard deviations in parentheses) are taken over 30 runs.
Table 1 also reports the distances for the Nash equilibrium predictions that
minimize the average distance from the center, i.e., the equilibria with as much
14
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clustering of players in the middle as possible, to compare the outcomes of the noisy
best-replies dynamics with the best Nash equilibrium predictions.11
Table 1 shows that when n = 3, regardless of the number of locations, the players
are within distance 2 from the center almost all the time. Moving beyond n = 3, the
average distance from the center increases with the number of players n. This is true
for all values of M . Focussing on M , we note that the average distance below which
the system spends time increases only very slightly as we move from M = 1500 to
M = 15, 000, and to M = 150, 000, with these increases being detectable only for
larger values of n. Thus, for example, for M = 1500 and n = 8, we see that the
distance from the center below which the system (i.e., the average distance of the n
players in the period concerned) spends 95% of the time is 265.5, and this increases
to only 271.9 when we increase the number of locations to 150,000 (a hundredfold
increase).
We can compare this with how the average distances in the Nash equilibria
increase with the number of locations. As we see in Table 1, the predictions of the
Nash equilibria are not affected by the refinements of the strategy space in the sense
that they are scaled up proportionally with the number of locations and hence stay
away from the median at a constant relative distance. For example, the average
distances from the center for n = 4 are 750, 7500, and 75,000 for M =1500, 15,000
and 150,000, respectively.12
Table 1 also reflects the fact that as n increases, the average distance of the Nash
equilibrium that is closest to the center is essentially constant.13 As n increases the
peripheral players get closer to the boundaries, but this is exactly offset by the
most central ones getting closer to the center, and thus the average distance stays
11For n = 3 this is based on the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, and therefore we report the
average distance below which the system will spend 90% of the time.
12If, for n = 3, we consider the 99% criterion instead of the 90% reported in the Table, these
will be 652, 6521, and 65, 213, for M = 1500, 15, 000, and 150, 000, respectively.
13Apart from some minor variances as different values of n lead to slightly different types of
Nash equilibrium configurations.
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M = 1500
n=3 n=4 n=5 n=6 n=7 n=8
90% 2.0 8.0 30.0 66.0 123.7 203.7
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.5) (0.6)
95% 2.0 10.0 40.0 86.9 161.3 265.5
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.3) (0.5) (0.9)
99% 2.0 15.0 65.9 139.9 247.4 409.3
(0.0) (0.0) (0.4) (0.3) (0.8) (1.4)
NE 539 750 800 667 804 750
M = 15, 000
n=3 n=4 n=5 n=6 n=7 n=8
90% 2.0 8.0 30.0 66.1 124.1 204.6
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.3) (0.4) (0.6)
95% 2.0 10.0 40.0 87.3 164.2 271.1
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.5) (0.4) (0.9)
99% 2.0 15.0 67.2 152.0 291.5 481.9
(0.0) (0.0) (0.4) (0.5) (1.4) (2.4)
NE 5392 7500 8000 6667 8036 7500
M = 150, 000
n=3 n=4 n=5 n=6 n=7 n=8
90% 2.0 8.0 30.0 66.1 124.2 204.7
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.3) (0.4) (0.6)
95% 2.0 10.0 40.0 87.5 164.6 271.9
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.5) (0.5) (0.8)
99% 2.0 15.0 67.9 154.0 302.0 525.6
(0.0) (0.0) (0.3) (0.5) (1.4) (3.8)
NE 53,914 75,000 80,000 66,667 80,357 75,000
Table 1: Mean distances from the center (with standard deviations in parentheses),
and NE distances, for M = 1500, 15, 000, 150, 000, n = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, with  = 0.001
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constant. A good example of this is a comparison the average distance for the Nash
equilibria reported for n = 4 and 8.
We can conclude that Table 1 confirms what we saw in Figure 1, i.e. that the
best-response dynamics do not converge to the Nash equilibria.14 Our numerical
analysis also shows that for any n > 2, as M , and hence the number of locations,
increases, the players tend to spend their time farther and farther away from the
Nash equilibrium predictions and within smaller and smaller regions around the
center. In other words, as we refine the discrete strategy space, approximating a
continuous strategy space, we can get the players locating arbitrarily close to the
median when they follow best-response dynamics.
Thus, the best-response dynamics restore something close to the Principle of
Minimum Differentiation and as a result, the preferences of the median voter will
tend to rule.
4 Long run behavior: analyzing the invariant
measure with three players
With the numerical analysis presented in Section 3 in mind, in this section and in
Section 5, we characterize the long-run properties of the system. For any number of
locations M and any level of noise , the long run behavior of the location dynamics
is described by the invariant distribution µM, of an ergodic Markov chain. The
dynamics that we observe in the numerical analysis after a sufficiently large number
of time steps, are in fact sample paths from the distribution µM,. Our analytical
results concerning the behavior of the location dynamics are based on an asymptotic
analysis (w.r.t. M and ) of the invariant distribution µM,. In other words, we study
this distribution when the number of locations tends to infinity and/or the level of
14That the best-response dynamics lead to outcomes that are in some sense the ‘opposite’ of the
Nash equilibrium predictions was also observed in Pancs and Vriend (2007).
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noise is driven to zero. The asymptotic analysis is relevant for understanding the
behavior of the dynamics when the number of locations is finite but large and for
positive but small levels of noise, which is precisely the setting we are interested in
here.
For the case of n = 3 players analyzed in this section, we will let the number
of locations M be fixed and drive noise down to zero, as is a standard approach in
the equilibrium selection literature. The states in which the invariant measure is
concentrated as noise goes to zero are referred to as the stochastically stable states,
and correspond to outcomes that remain stable when players make errors with a
small probability.
In the case with four players, presented in Section 5, we will use the fact that
M is large and we will study the behavior of µM, driving M to infinity and noise
down to zero simultaneously, while imposing some conditions on the relative speed
of convergence of these quantities. Although by doing so we lose the connection
to the equilibrium selection approach, such an asymptotic analysis, as we argued
above, does indeed capture the behavior of our system when the number of locations
is large and the noise level small.
The reason we present two distinct approaches for n = 3 and n = 4 is related to
the difference in the dynamics between these two cases as we have seen in Section 3.
For n = 3, as observed in the numerical analysis and as we will prove in this section,
the agents spend almost all their time at locations whose average distance from
the center is strictly less than three. Thus, the typical distance to the center is
bounded independently of the system size. For n ≥ 4, instead, there are repeated
waves of two-sided expansion and one-sided contraction centered around the middle.
The distance of these waves from the center is typically very small compared to the
number of locations, but it is not bounded independently of the latter. When the
number of locations increases, the maximal distance of the waves from the center
18
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.37
also increases but at a speed that is some orders of magnitude smaller. Thus, as
the number of locations increases, the sizes of the waves will become negligible
compared to the size of the system. We will make such statements more precise in
the asymptotic framework presented in Section 5. In the remainder of this section
we will characterize the stochastically stable steady states for the case of three firms.
4.1 Absorbing classes
It is well known that when noise is driven down to zero, the invariant distribution
will concentrate on some union of absorbing classes. A set of states is an absorbing
class if we remain within the class under best reply without noise ( = 0). Thus, we
begin by characterizing the absorbing classes of our system.
Recall that we consider a system where the center is unique and denoted by M .
The leftmost location is then 0 and the rightmost location 2M . Let (a, b, c) denote
the locations of the players, adopting the convention that a ≤ b ≤ M < c. By
symmetry, we consider, without loss of generality, the case where two players are
to the left of the center and the third player on the other side.15 The number of
positions to the left of a is then a and the number of positions to the right of c is
2M − c. If a > 2M − c it is preferable to locate to the left of a than to the right of c
and conversely. If a = 2M−c these two choices are indifferent. We will also consider
the distance between the peripheral, i.e. the most extremely located, players, which
under the above assumptions is the length of the interval [a, c], i.e., c − a. Also,
a and 2M − c are the distances of the peripheral players to the boundaries. For
given M , when a and 2M − c increase, the distance to the center decreases. We
will denote the set of best replies to (a, b, c) by BR(a, b, c). Since all players are
identical we do not care who is located where so we will take BR(a, b, c) to be an
unordered set. We will denote by BRl, BRm, BRr the best responses of the leftmost,
15The case where all players are on the same side will be treated separately.
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middle and rightmost player respectively. We denote by BRlt, BR
m
t , BR
r
t the t-th
best response of the leftmost etc. player.16 We denote by BRt(a, b, c), or sometimes
for convenience simply BRt, the locations of the players after t periods, determined
by best replies, starting from (a, b, c). Best replies may be non-unique.
The following proposition characterizes the absorbing classes of the system.
Proposition 1 Let C = {(M − 3,M − 1,M + 1), (M − 1,M + 1,M + 3), (M,M +
2,M + 2), (M,M − 2,M − 2), (M − 1,M + 1,M + 1), (M − 1,M − 1,M + 1), (M −
2,M,M + 2), } and Ck = {(M − k,M − k,M + k− 1), (M − k+ 1,M + k,M + k)}.
Then, C is an absorbing class, and Ck is an absorbing class for 1 ≤ k ≤ K, where
K =: max{k|2M − (M + k − 1) > 2k−1
2
}.
Proof: Immediate verification. The condition on k ensures that the players on the
left will prefer location M + k to an interior location. 
Although it is possible to show that C and (Ck)
k=K
k=1 are the only absorbing
classes, we will not need this result. In fact, in our analysis we will focus on the
following union of absorbing classes: Define S = C
⋃
C1
⋃
C2.
4.2 Basins of attraction
If an element that is not in the absorbing class S will eventually lead to S by best
replies with probability one, it is said to belong to the basin of attraction of S. The
basins of attraction of the absorbing classes play an important role in determining
their stochastic stability. We recall that the basin of attraction B(S) of an absorbing
class S is: B(S) = {z|Prob (∃ T st BRt(z) ∈ S ∀ t > T ) = 1}).
As the following two lemmas show, a large subset of configurations is in the basin
of attraction B(S) of the union of absorbing classes S defined above.
16Note that BRlt refers to the t-th best reply of the leftmost player at time t − 1, which is not
necessarily the leftmost player in the initial configuration.
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Lemma 1 Any configuration (a, b, c) where a ≤ b ≤ c ≤ M (or M ≤ a ≤ b ≤ c),
i.e. with all players on the same side of the center, is in the basin of attraction of
S.
Proof: We make explicit the possible BR sequences. If a ≤ b < c ≤ M ,
BR(a, b, c) = (b + 1, c + 1,+c + 1). If b < 2M − c − 2, BR2 = (c + 2, c + 2, c + 2),
which is considered below. If b ≥ 2M − c − 2, which is only possible if c = M and
b ∈ {M − 1,M − 2}, these cases correspond to BR ∈ {(M,M + 1,M + 1), (M −
1,M + 1,M + 1)}. The first is in C1 and the second in C. If a ≤ b = c < M , we
get (c+ 1, c+ 1, c+ 1), (c+ 2, c+ 2, c+ 2), and then all the way to (M,M,M). The
configuration (M,M,M) leads either to (M−1,M−1,M+1) or (M−1,M+1,M+1),
which are both in C or to (M−1,M−1,M−1) and then (M,M,M) or similarly to
(M + 1,M + 1,M + 1) and then (M,M,M). In this case we cycle, but with positive
probability we will eventually reach C from (M,M,M). 
Lemma 2 Any configuration that lies within [M − 3,M + 3]−C3 is in the basin of
attraction of S.
Proof: Given in Appendix A. It simply requires checking a number of
configurations. 
Combined, Lemmas 1 and 2 characterize the basin of attraction B(S) of the
union of absorbing classes S that is the focus of our analysis.
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4.3 Stochastically stable steady states: Radius, coradius
results
To show that the invariant distribution will be concentrated on S, we will use the
radius-coradius theorem of Ellison (2000). The main idea behind this theorem is to
associate a cost to any path of transitions. Loosely speaking, this cost is proportional
to the number of random events (i.e. choices that are not best replies) required on
the path. The stochastic stability of a set is then determined by comparing the cost
of leaving its basin of attraction and the cost of entering its basin of attraction from
the outside.
The Hotelling model with noise lies within the general setting considered by
Ellison (2000) since a player locates with probability 1 − p on a best reply, and
with probability p uniformly at random. In the Hotelling model, we can define a
cost function as follows: the cost of the transition from configuration z1 to z2 is
c(z1, z2) = 3 − m, where m is the number of players in z2 who play a best reply
to z1. In other words, the cost of a transition is the number of random events it
requires. The cost of a path (z1, ..., zt) can then be defined as
∑i=t−1
i=1 c(zi, zi+1). It
can be verified that this cost function satisfies the properties required to use Ellison’s
radius-coradius theorem.
The crucial quantities defined by Ellison (2000) are the radius and coradius of
S, R(S) and CR(S) respectively. The coradius of S basically measures the number
of random events required to reach B(S) from outside S. The radius of a union
of stochastically stable sets measures the random events required to leave B(S)
starting from S.
The main result in Ellison (2000) is that the invariant measure is concentrated
on a union of absorbing classes such that the number of random events required to
leave this set (the radius) is greater than the number of random events required to
reach it from the outside (the coradius):
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Theorem 1 (Ellison, 2000) In a model of evolution with noise, let Ω be a union of
limit states. If R(Ω) > CR(Ω) then the long run stochastically stable set is contained
in Ω.
We will use this theorem in order to show that the stochastically stable steady
state is contained in S = C
⋃
C1
⋃
C2. We first compute the radius and coradius of
S.
Proposition 2 Let S = C
⋃
C1
⋃
C2, then the coradius of S, CR(S) = 1.
To see that a single random event is sufficient to enter the basin of attraction
of S, consider some Ck with k > 2. To move from such a Ck into S, it is sufficient
that one player, the one who is alone on one side, relocates at random to the other
side.17
Proposition 3 The radius of S, R(S) > 1.
We show that a single random event is not enough to leave the basin of attraction
of S with Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 Take a configuration s ∈ S. Relocate one player. Call this configuration
ω. Then there exists 0 < t < 3 such that BRt(ω) ∈ ([M − 3,M + 3]− C3)
⋃
B(S).
Proof: Given in Appendix A. It simply requires checking a number of
configurations. 
Lemma 3 shows that after a single random event, we will return to ([M −3,M +
3]− C3)
⋃
B(S), which by Lemma 2 is also in B(S). Consequently, any path from
S to a configuration that is not in the basin of attraction of S requires at least two
random events, and hence the cost is strictly greater than 1.
17Note that this applies to any configuration outside B(S), as they are all of the two on one side
versus one on the other side type.
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Combining Proposition 2 and 3 shows that the radius R(S) is strictly greater
than the coradius CR(S), and together with the theorem in Ellison (2000) this gives
us the main result for our analysis of the case of three players:
Corollary 1 The long run stochastically stable set is a subset of S = C
⋃
C1
⋃
C2.
All configurations in S are such that the average distance to the center is strictly
smaller than 3, and for none of the players is the distance to the center greater than
3.
5 Long run behavior: analyzing the invariant
measure with four players
We now move to the analysis of cases with four or more players. As mentioned
already, the case with more than three players differs qualitatively from the case
with only three players and needs to be studied using a different approach.
With only three players, in the absence of random noise, the central location
belongs to an absorbing class. This is not the case with more than three players.
In this case, players will move away from the center in waves and then return to it.
However, we will show that the distance to the center will typically remain small
compared to the system size as a whole when the latter is large. To capture this
intuition formally, we let the number of locations grow and impose some restrictions
on the level of random noise compared to the number of locations. We then show
that the invariant measure is concentrated on the center and on some absorbing
classes close to the center. We first provide some notation needed to state our main
result.
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5.1 Description and notation
We denote by N the 2M +1 locations indexed by {0, 1, 2, ...,M,M +1, ..., 2M}. Let
ω ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...,M,M+1, ..., 2M}4 be a configuration, i.e. giving the locations of the
four players. For convenience, we will write ω = (a ∗ k, ...), when the configuration
ω has k (k ≥ 3) players located at a.
We denote by a¯ the configuration where all players are at location a. The distance
between two locations a and b is d(a, b) = |a−b|. For a configuration ω = (a, b, c, d),
we define the distance from the center M as d(ω,M) =: maxi=a,b,c,dd(i,M). Given
a configuration ω at date t, the configuration at t + 1 is given by the realization of
the following random variables: (1) First, we determine the number of players who
do not relocate at one of their best replies. This number is given by a binomial
random variable Xt = Bin(, 4). (2) Given the realization of Xt, we draw a variable
Yt following a uniform law on all the subsets of {1, 2, 3, 4} of size Xt. If Xt = 1,
each player has probability 1
4
of being selected for relocation. (3) Finally, for any
element e ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} such that e ∈ Yt, we draw its location uniformly at random.
Any player who is not drawn for random relocation, picks each of his best replies
according to a uniform probability.
This description, where we draw first the number of uniformly relocated players,
then their identity, then their location, is convenient for our proof and obviously
equivalent to relocating each player uniformly at random with i.i.d. probability
. Let us also introduce some notation for some particular subsets of configurations
that will be of interest. Let A be the set of configurations where all players are on the
same side (i.e. ≥M or ≤M). Analogous to the case of three players, we note that
the classes consisting of the two states {((M−a)∗3,M+a−1), (M−a+1, (M+a)∗3)},
with the same restriction on a as we saw for k in Proposition 1, are absorbing classes
for the dynamics. Let us denote by ΩAC the set of such absorbing classes. Moreover,
let ΩlAC be the subset of such classes for which d(a,M) < l, in other words absorbing
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classes containing configurations that are closer than l to the center.
5.2 Setting and main result
In the case of n = 3 players, the number of locations was fixed and the level of
noise  converged to zero asymptotically. In other words, we studied the behavior
of the invariant distribution µN,, holding N fixed and taking the noise  down to
zero. For the case with n = 4 players, we will analyze the behavior of the invariant
distribution µN, when N goes to infinity and  goes down to zero. We will put
some restrictions on the level of noise compared to the number of locations. To
this effect, assume that the level of noise in a Hotelling model with N locations is
N
18 The invariant measure µN,N will be denoted simply by µ
N . Our main result
characterizes the asymptotic behavior of µN under some assumptions on the speed
at which N goes down to zero as N increases.
Theorem 2 In the Hotelling model with N locations, let IN be an interval centered
at M containing lN locations. Let SN be a subset of locations such that ω ∈ SN ⇐⇒
ω ∈ [M − 3,M + 3]⋃Ωl/2AC ⊂ IN . Let BN be any set of states BN ⊂ Ic such
that card(BN) ≤ card(SN). Suppose that the Condition 1 below is verified, then
limN→∞
µN (BN )
µN (SN )
= 0.
Condition 1 There exist constants α ∈]0, 1
7
[, βM <∞ and N0 such that for every
N ≥ N0, lN = Nα and the level of random noise N verifies N = N−β, where
β ∈ [1, βM ].
Theorem 2 states that when we consider a certain set of states SN included in
a ‘small’ (some orders of magnitude smaller than N) interval around the center,
IN , any set containing the same number of locations as SN (or a smaller number)
and that is located outside of the interval IN , i.e. farther from the center, has an
18Later on, when N is fixed, for convenience we will omit the index N , writing simply .
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invariant measure that is vanishingly small compared to the measure of SN when
the number of locations is large. In particular, it follows from this result that states
close to the center have more weight than the Nash equilibrium, and also more
weight than absorbing classes farther from the center.
How demanding are assumptions under which this asymptotic result holds? The
most important restriction imposed by Condition 1 concerns the speed at which N
goes down to zero as the number of locations increases, since we must have N ≤ 1N .
The upper bound of the size of the interval lN is not a demanding condition in our
context. Since we want to show that the invariant measure is concentrated close
to the center, we are only interested in intervals lN that are small compared to the
total number of locations N . The lower bound of the size of lN and the lower bound
on the noise are not very restrictive. Together they guarantee that 2N ≥ plN for any
0 < p < 1 when N is large. We should note that Condition 1 is a sufficient but not
necessary condition.
5.3 Analysis of the dynamics of the system and intuition for
our results
Before turning to the proof of Theorem 2 itself, we will provide some intuition for the
result based on the behavior of the system’s dynamics. A central part of our proof
is to show that starting from the center, we will return to it with high probability.
As we have seen in the numerical analysis shown in Figure 1, starting from the
center, in absence of random noise, the dynamics would be as follows. If two players
locate at M − 1 and two at M + 1, we move farther away from the center. However,
there is also a positive probability that all players locate on the same side. As we
have established previously, the dynamics will then bring them back to the center.
Similarly, in the next step, all players may locate on M − 2 and M + 2 but again,
with positive probability, they may all end up on the same side. In each period, we
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can move farther away from the center but there is also a positive probability that
all players end up on the same side. The probability that the latter does not occur
in a long sequence of time steps is very small.19 This description of the dynamics
ignores the possibility of random relocations. However, with high probability only
few random relocations occur (as shown in Lemma 4 in subsection 5.3.2). This
makes the dynamics somewhat more complex but not significantly different from
what is described above.
An occasional random relocation may lead to various configurations within the
interval I. However, we show (Lemma 5 in subsection 5.3.3) that the configurations
we reach are always either contracting, in the sense that best replies bring us closer
to the center, or, if the state is such that best replies can be farther away from the
center with positive probability, there is also a positive probability that all players
end up on the same side. This is because such configurations involve indifference on
the part of some players. The typical, but not unique, example of such a state is the
one described previously where two players are at M − k and two players at M + k.
Thus, we can only move far away from the center if we pass through configurations
of the second type a large number of times. However, each time we do, there is a
positive probability that all players end up on the same side and the probability of
avoiding this event for a long time is very small.
So far, we have ignored the possibility of entering one of the absorbing classes
in ΩlAC . This case is analyzed separately in subsection 5.3.4. If such a class is
reached, we remain there for a long time. The most probable way to exit is with
a single random relocation. When a single random relocation occurs, with positive
probability we move to another absorbing class farther from the center, or, also with
positive probability, we enter a state where all players are on the same side. Again,
it is highly unlikely to have a long sequence of realizations where we move farther
19The conditions we impose in Theorem 2 guarantee that the probability of not returning in this
way is in fact smaller than the probability of a random relocation.
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away from the center without an occurrence of an event where all players end up on
the same side.
Finally, the proof also involves showing that with a single random relocation we
can move back from any state to the center. This is the object of subsection 5.3.5.
5.3.1 Proof of Theorem 2
In what follows, we often do not need to establish exact values of quantities but
only their order of magnitude with respect to N when N is large. We will thus use
the notation g(N) = O(f(N)) if 0 < limN→∞
f(N)
g(N
<∞. Moreover, from now on we
will write l for lN and  for N .
Our proof will make use of the following property of the invariant distribution
of a Markov chain: µ(S) = µ(b)E[V (S, b, b)], where V (S, b, b) is a random variable
that counts the number of times that the process reaches an element in S before it
reaches b, starting from state b.20
To bound the value of this expectation, we will bound on the one hand the
expected number of times we return to S starting from S, and also bound the
probability of reaching S from a state in Ic. These two bounds are the object of the
following two propositions:
Proposition 4 The probability of not returning to the set S when starting from a
configuration in S is bounded above by 1− q = O( 
l2
).
Proposition 5 Let b ∈ IC, the probability of reaching S from b without passing
again through b is bounded below by q˜ = O().
The event V (S, b, b) = k, requires first that we move from b ∈ IC to S without
passing again through b, which occurs with a probability greater than q˜, and then
that starting from S, we return again to S exactly k − 1 times before reaching
20See, e.g., Kemeny and Snell (1960).
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b again. Due to propositions 4 and 5, we can bound the expectation as follows:
E[V (S, b, b)] =
∑∞
k=1 q˜kq
k(1− q) = q˜E[Z], where Z is a geometric law of parameter
q. Thus E[Z] = 1
1−q and E[V (S, b, b)] =
q˜
1−q = O(
l2

). The number of elements in
the set S is at most 2l, because we can index the states in ΩlAC by the location of the
three players who are at the same location. Therefore if card(B) ≤ card(S) ≤ 2l,
limN→∞
µN (S)
µN (B)
= limN→∞
µN (S)∑i=card(B)
i=1 µ
N (b)
= limN→∞2lE[V (S, b, b)] =∞. 
The rest of the section will provide proofs of Propositions 4 and 5. A number of
lemmas needed for these proofs will be presented in the next subsections.
5.3.2 Typical sequences: bounding the probability of rare events
Scenarios where two or more random relocations occur close to each other are very
unlikely. It will be useful to bound the probability of such an event to show that
it is very small. This is the objective of Lemma 4. When we study the dynamics,
we will then condition on the fact that there is at most one random relocation in a
given number of periods.
Definition 1 We will say that a sequence is typical if it contains at most one
random relocation and this relocation is not located in I.
Lemma 4 The probability that a sequence of length l is not typical is at most O( l
2
N
).
Proof: The probability of at least two random relocations in a sequence of length
l is
∑k=4l
k=2 
k(1 − )4l−kC4lk ≤
∑k=4l
k=2 
k(4l)k = (4l)
2−(4l)4l+1
1−4l = O(
2l2). Note that
we have 4l because at each date, there are four players who each relocate with
probability . The probability that there is exactly one random relocation and that
it is in I is smaller than 4l l
N
= O( l
2
N
). 
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5.3.3 Best reply dynamics starting from a state close to the center
In what follows, a state will be ω =: (a, b, c, d) with a ≤ b ≤ c ≤ d and l(ω) = d− a.
Lemma 5, proven in Appendix B.1 together with some other lemmas, tells us
that starting from a configuration close to the center and assuming the sequence is
typical, best replies will either take us closer to the center than before, or, if there is
a positive probability of moving farther away from the center, there is also a positive
probability that all the agents end up on the same side, or, as a final possibility, we
may enter an absorbing class close to the center.
Lemma 5 Assume that the evolution is ‘typical’ as in Definition 1 above. Any state
ω ∈ I − S belongs to ⋃i=4i=1 Ωi where:
• If ω ∈ Ω1,Then P ((BRt+4(ω)
⋃
BRt+5(ω)) = x¯ ∈ I) ≥ p (p ≥ 1
83
)and if this
does not occur, d(BR2(ω),M) ≤ d(ω,M) + 2.
• If ω ∈ Ω2, then d(BR(ω),M) ≤ d(ω,M) and l(BR(ω)) ≤ l(ω), with at least
one strict inequality.
• If ω ∈ Ω3, then BR(ω) is at the same distance to the center as ω and
BR(ω) ∈ Ω1
⋃
Ω2.
• If ω ∈ Ω4, then BR2(ω) belongs to an absorbing class in ΩlAC with l <
d(ω,M) + 2.
We will also need a lemma that tells us that when the sequence is typical, a state
of the type x¯ ∈ I leads to [M − 3,M + 3].
Lemma 6 If we are in x¯ ∈ I at date t and the sequence is typical until t + l, we
reach a state in [M − 3,M + 3] within l periods.
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5.3.4 Best reply dynamics starting from an absorbing class Ω
l/2
AC
We also need to determine what happens when we exit an absorbing class in Ω
l/2
AC .
Lemma 7 Consider a date t at which the deterministic best reply is ω = ((M−a)∗
3, (M + a− 1)) ∈ Ωl/2AC (without loss of generality). Conditioning on the fact that a
single random relocation outside of I occurs at t, and no random relocation occurs
at t+ 1, the state at t+ 1 can be
• ωt+1 = ((M−a)∗3, (M +a−1)) ∈ Ωl/2AC, i.e. we remain in the same absorbing
class at the same distance from the center.
• ωt+1 ∈ A. This happens with probability at least p = 18 , and consequently, the
probability that ωt+3 = x¯ ∈ I is at least p = 1/8 times the probability that no
random relocation occurs at t+ 2 or t+ 3.
• ωt+1 ∈ {(M−a−1)∗3, (M+a)}, that is in an absorbing class one step further
from the center than before, which occurs with at most probability 1− p.
Lemma 8 Starting from any state ω ∈ Ωl/2AC, the probability of returning to S before
reaching a configuration in IC is greater than 1−O( 
l2
).
Lemma 7 are 8 are proven in Appendix B.1. Now, we can prove Proposition 4.
5.3.5 Proof of Proposition 4
We want to bound the probability of returning to S from a state in S = [M−3,M+
3]
⋃
Ω
l/2
AC . First, consider the case where we start from an ω ∈ [M − 3,M + 3]. Let
us bound the probability of returning in at most l/4 periods, assuming that the
sequence is typical over these periods. We can assume that we do not enter an
absorbing class because if we do we have returned to S, so |Ω4|=0. Note that by
Lemma 5, we have |Ω3| = |Ω1| + |Ω2| since any successor of an element in Ω3 is
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in Ω1
⋃
Ω2. Also note that if |Ω1| < 2|Ω2|, then we have returned to the center M
because the configurations in Ω2 contract one step and those in Ω1 grow at most
two steps. Therefore we must have |Ω3| + |Ω1| + |Ω2| = l4 , where |Ω1| ≥ 2|Ω2|.
Suppose that |Ω1| < l24 . Then |Ω2| ≤ 2l24 and |Ω3| < 3l24 . But this contradicts
|Ω3|+ |Ω1|+ |Ω2| = l4 . Consequently, |Ω1| ≥ l24 . Each time we are in Ω1, we enter a
state x¯ ∈ I with probability p. From such a state we then return to [M − 3,M + 3]
if the sequence is typical by Lemma 6. The probability of not reaching a x¯ ∈ I
in l/24 trials is (1 − p)l/24 ≤ O(2), which is a consequence of Condition 1 since
0 < (1 − p) 124 < 1. Consequently, the probability of returning to S is bounded by
1− (1− p)l/24 times the probability that the sequence is typical for l/4 + l periods.
Using Lemma 4 this probability is greater than (1− O(2))[1− 2l2] = 1− O(2l2).
In the case which was not considered before, where we start from a state ω ∈ Ωl/2AC ,
it is sufficient to apply Lemma 8. 
5.3.6 Proof of Proposition 5
Proposition 5 is a consequence of Lemma 9 below which is proved in Appendix B.2:
Lemma 9 For any configuration ω ∈ AC, there exists a random relocation of a
player, which occurs with probability O() such that A is reached in at most three
steps.
The proposition follows almost immediately from this lemma. Indeed, once in A,
the configuration will move towards the center at the pace of one location per time
step. To reach the center, it is thus sufficient that no random relocation occurs in N
steps. The probability that this is the case is (1−p)N , where p = 1− (1− )4. Since
 < 1/N , we have (1 − p)N = O(1). Consequently, the probability of reaching M
from b ∈ AC is given by the probability of entering A, which is O(), since a single
random relocation takes us to A, times the probability that no random relocation
33
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.37
occurs for N periods after entering A, which has probability O(1). The result in
Proposition 5 follows. 
5.4 A remark regarding extensions to n > 4
In this section, we have provided a proof for the case n = 4 players. For cases n > 4,
the dynamics starting from the center are similar: we move away from the center
as long as all players do not locate on the same side. With probability (1
2
)n−1 all
players end up on the same side and we return to the center. It would seem possible
to generalize the proof regarding the probability of returning to the center to the
case n > 4. However, proving that a single random relocation takes us back from
any location to the center becomes less manageable, because there is a large number
of cases to consider. We conjecture that the behavior of the system for n > 4 is
similar to the case n = 4, as is suggested by the numerical analysis.
Analyzing the dynamics also allows us to understand why the average distance to
the center is larger when we increase the number of players. Indeed, the probability
that all players end up on the same side and then return to the center is pn =: (
1
2
)n−1
at each time step, and thus the expected value of the first time that this occurs is
1/Pn.
6 Concluding remarks
We considered a linear location model (Hotelling, 1929) in which players follow noisy
myopic best-replies. We asked what are the likely configurations in terms of numbers
of players in each location in such a case.
We analyzed numerically how the average distance from the center depends on
the number of players n and the number of locations 2M + 1, showing that by
refining the discrete strategy space we can get the players locate arbitrarily close to
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the center almost all the time.
In our formal, mathematical analysis we prove, in the case of n = 3 players,
that all the players are located in close proximity of the center in the stochastically
stable steady states. For the case of n = 4 we prove that the players will tend to be
located near the center if the noise is small (in a sense made precise) relative to the
number of locations. The logic of the proof for n = 4 seems applicable to any n ≥ 5
as well.
Although our analyses show that we do not necessarily always have all players
located precisely in the center, and thus we do not always have the minimum
differentiation as the principle of minimum differentiation would suggest, our
analyses suggest that if players are myopic and adaptive, we may tend to observe
outcomes that conform rather closely to the principle of minimum differentiation,
with the difference becoming negligible as the space is refined and approximates a
continuum. Thus, we re-established Hotelling’s principle for this class of boundedly
rational players, and provided a possible explanation for the relatively common
perception that decision makers in a wide range of situations tend to cater to the
median voter: The return of the median voter.
As mentioned already in Section 1, and emphasized by Hotelling (1929) to start
with, interpreting the location model as one of electoral competition is only one of the
many possibilities, and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation seems applicable
in a wide range of situations of players competing in some discrete or continuous
strategy space. Thus, our analysis of the best-response dynamics seems relevant in
particular also for market dynamics, with the firms competing e.g. in geographical
space or product characteristics space.21
Focussing on geographical space, the total distance between the locations chosen
by the firms and the preferred locations of the consumers corresponds to the total
21Firms may compete in other dimensions too. For example, Ewerhart (2014) discuss competition
between professional forecasters with reputational concerns.
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travel distance for the consumers, and we can use this to do some welfare analysis. As
Eaton and Lipsey (1975) already indicated, one important aspect of the multiplicity
of the Nash equilibria in the Hotelling model is that these travel costs may differ
from equilibrium to equilibrium. Our analysis adds a new dimension to this, as
the best-response dynamics lead to outcomes that stand in stark contrast to these
Nash equilibria. It is not just that we do not get perfect convergence to the Nash
equilibria. What we see is that these equilibria are not even approximated, as the
system moves into other directions, with minimum differentiation quickly emerging.
This implies an important welfare loss as less differentiation means substantially
increased travel costs compared with any of the Nash equilibria.
Thus, to the extent that firms may be inclined to adopt behavior resembling
myopic best-replies, our analysis suggests that from a policy (welfare) point of view,
it may be important to look beyond an equilibrium analysis of such models.
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A Appendix: Proofs for the three player case
A.1 Lemma 2
Proof: Because we have shown that when all the three players are on the same
side (AOS, for ‘all one side’), we are in B(S), we consider the remaining cases.
There are 19 cases that we need to consider (up to symmetry). And, for each
case, we will show the best response path either reaches the state where all the
players are on the same side AOS or S.
(i) [M − 3,M − 3,M + 3] → either
• [M − 4,M − 4,M − 2] ∈ AOS
• [M + 4,M + 4,M − 2]→ [M − 1,M − 1,M + 3], which will be considered
below (xi)
• [M − 4,M + 4,M − 2] → either
– [M − 5,M − 1,M − 5] ∈ AOS
– [M − 3,M − 1,M + 5]→ [M − 2,M − 4,M ] ∈ AOS
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(ii) [M − 3,M − 2,M + 3] → either
• [M − 3,M − 4,M − 1] ∈ AOS
• [M − 3,M + 4,M − 1]→ [M − 2,M,M − 4] ∈ AOS
(iii) [M − 3,M − 1,M + 3] → either
• [M − 2,M − 4,M ] ∈ AOS
• [M − 2,M + 4,M ]→ [M − 1,M − 3,M + 1] ∈ S
(iv) [M − 3,M,M + 3] → either
• [M−1,M+4,M+1]→ either [M,M+2,M−2] ∈ S or [M+2,M+2,M ] ∈
S
• [M−1,M−4,M+1]→ either [M+2,M+2,M ] ∈ S or [M+2,M−2,M ] ∈
S
(v) [M − 3,M − 3,M + 1]→ [M + 2,M + 2,M − 2] to be considered below (xiv)
(vi) [M − 3,M − 2,M + 1]→ [M + 2,M + 2,M − 1] ∈ S
(vii) [M − 3,M − 2,M + 2]→ [M + 3,M + 3,M − 1] considered above (v)
(viii) [M − 3,M − 1,M + 2]→ [M + 3,M + 3,M ] ∈ AOS
(ix) [M − 3,M,M + 1]→ [M + 2,M + 2,M + 1] ∈ AOS
(x) [M − 3,M,M + 2]→ [M + 3,M + 3,M + 1] ∈ AOS
(xi) [M − 3,M + 1,M + 1]→ [M,M − 2,M − 2] ∈ S
(xii) [M − 3,M + 1,M + 2]→ [M,M + 3,M + 2] ∈ AOS
(xiii) [M − 3,M + 2,M + 2]→ [M + 1,M − 2,M − 2] ∈ S
(xiv) [M − 2,M − 2,M + 2] → either
40
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.37
• [M − 3,M − 3,M − 1] ∈ AOS
• [M − 3,M + 3,M − 1] considered above (iii)
(xv) [M − 2,M − 1,M + 1] → either
• [M − 2,M + 2,M ] ∈ S
• [M + 2,M + 2,M ] ∈ S
(xvi) [M − 2,M − 1,M + 2] → either
• [M − 2,M + 3,M ] considered above (x)
• [M − 2,M − 3,M ] ∈ AOS
(xvii) [M − 2,M,M + 1] → either
• [M − 1,M + 2,M + 1] considered above (xv)
• [M,M + 2,M − 2] ∈ S
(xviii) [M − 2,M + 1,M + 1]→ [M − 2,M − 2,M ] ∈ S
(xix) [M − 1,M,M + 1] → either
• [M − 1,M − 2,M + 1] considered above (xv)
• [M − 1,M + 2,M + 1] considered above (xv)

A.2 Lemma 3
Proof: Let s = (a, b, c) ∈ S, and consider all possible cases.
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• First case, we relocate the middle player b: If he is relocated in [0,M − 4],
then BRr = a + 1, BRm = c + 1 and the best reply of the left player is a− 1
or c+ 1. We are in [M −3,M + 3]−C3 unless c = M + 3 or a = M −3. In the
first case s = (M − 1,M + 1,M + 3) and BR = (M − 2,M,M + 4) but then
BR2 = (M−3,M−1,M+1) ∈ S. In the second case s = (M−3,M−1,M+1)
and BR2 = (M − 2,M,M + 2) ∈ S. The case where he is relocated on the
right is identical by symmetry.
• Second, we relocate the rightmost player c: If we relocate him on the left we are
in [0,M ]. If he is relocated on [M+4, 2M ], then BR = (a−1, b−1, b+1). This
is in [M−3,M+3]−C3 unless a = M−3. But then s = (M−3,M−1,M+1)
and BR = (M − 4,M − 2,M) ∈ [0,M ].
• Third, we relocate the leftmost player a: If he is relocated in [0,M − 4],
then BRr = b + 1, BRm = c + 1 and BRl is either b − 1 or c + 1. We are in
[M−3,M+3]−C3 unless c = M+3. If this is the case s = (M−1,M+1,M+3)
and BR = (M,M + 2,M + 4) ∈ [M, 2M ]. If we relocate the leftmost player
at a in [M + 4, 2M ], then BRl = c− 1, BRm = b− 1 and BRr is either c+ 1
or b− 1. We are in [M − 3,M + 3]−C3 unless c = M + 3 but in this last case,
BR = (M + 2,M,M) ∈ [M, 2M ].
• Finally, we need to check that we cannot get to C3 by relocating a single player
in a configuration s ∈ S. Indeed, we need to have two players at M − 3 or at
M + 3. Consider s = (M − 1,M + 1,M + 3) and (M − 3,M − 1,M + 1). We
cannot get from these to C3 by moving a single player.

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B Appendix: Proofs for the four player case
We begin by proving Lemma 5, 6, 7, and 8 used in Proposition 4. We then provide
a proof of Proposition 5.
B.1 Lemma 5 to 8
Proof: (of Lemma 5) First, we prove that Lemma 5 holds at a date t where no
random perturbation occurs. Let us prove that any state (a, b, c, d) ∈ I belongs to
one of the aforementioned categories.
• First, consider a < b ≤ c < d. Note that there are two possible cases, either
there are two players on each side of the center, or three players on one side and
one player alone on the other side. Sometimes, but not always, it is necessary
to treat these cases separately.
– First, consider the case d(a,M) = d(d,M). If c < M , the best reply
(a − 1, a − 1, b − 1, c + 1) ∈ A has positive probability, so we are in Ω1.
Suppose from now on that c ≥ M . If d(b − 1,M) ≥ d(c + 3,M), with
positive probability BRt = (a−1, a−1, b−1, c+1) , BR2 = (b, (c+2)∗3),
and with positive probabilityBR3 = (c+1, (c+3)∗3) ∈ A. If d(b−1,M) <
d(c + 3,M), with positive probability BRt = (d + 1, d + 1, b − 1, c + 1),
BR2 = (c, (b− 2) ∗ 3), and BR3 = (b− 1, (b− 3) ∗ 3) ∈ A.
– Suppose now without loss of generality that d(d,M) < d(a,M), that is
players prefer location d+ 1 to a− 1.
∗ If d(d+1,M) < d(a,M), then the maximal endpoint has contracted,
we are in Ω2.
∗ If d(d + 1,M) = d(a,M), then if d(b,M) > d(a + 2,M), BRt =
(b−1, d+1, d+1, c+1) and l(BRt(ω)) = (d+1)−(b−1) < d−a = l(ω).
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Thus, ω ∈ Ω2.
· If d(b,M) = d(a + 2,M), BRt = (a + 1, c + 1, d + 1, d + 1) and
BRt+1 = (a, a, a, c), which has contracted.
· If d(b,M) = d(a+1,M), we can have BRt = (a, c+1, d+1, d+1),
as a is indifferent between staying put and d+1. In the next step,
a will relocate at c. All others are indifferent between a− 1 and
d+ 2, so with positive probability they end up on the same side
as c so that A is reached. Thus we are in Ω1.
• Now consider the case (a, b, c, c) with a < b < c, where there are two players
at one of the endpoints.
– If d(a,M) = d(c,M), we are in Ω1 because due to indifference, there is a
positive probability that all players end up on the same side as b− 1.
– If d(a,M) ≥ d(c + 1,M), BRt = ((c + 1) ∗ 3, b − 1). Thus, we assume
b ≤ M . Since c + 1 − (b − 1) = c − b + 2, the interval has contracted
unless b ∈ {a + 1, a + 2}. If d(b,M) = d(a + 1,M), ω = (a, a + 1, c, c)
and (c + 1) ∗ 4 ∈ A ∈ BRt. If b = a + 2, and if d(a,M) > d(c + 1,M),
with positive probability BRt = (c+1)∗4 ∈ A. If d(a,M) = d(c+1,M),
BRt = (a+ 1, (c+ 1) ∗ 3) which is an absorbing state. We are then in Ω4.
– If d(a,M) ≤ d(c − 1,M), BRt = ((a − 1) ∗ 3, b − 1), and since
b− 1− (a− 1) = b− a < c− a, we are in Ω2.
• If the configuration is (a, c, c, c), if d(c,M) ≤ d(a,M), with positive probability
all players locate on the same side and we reach A. If d(a,M) < d(c,M),
BRt = ((a − 1) ∗ 3, c − 1). If d(a − 1,M) = d(c,M), we are in an absorbing
state. Otherwise the maximal endpoint has decreased and we are in Ω2.
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• Finally if the configuration is (a, a, c, c), without loss of generality d(a,M) ≤
d(c,M) and with positive probability, BRt = (a− 1) ∗ 4 ∈ A.
Now, consider a date t at which exactly one player is relocated randomly. Let
Lp and Rp be the leftmost and rightmost endpoint at time t. At t + 1, the players
who best reply are not further from the center than max{−Lp−1, Rp+1}. Suppose
that BRt+1 = (a, b, c, r). The player who locates at random at r locates outside the
interval I. At t + 2, the player located at random will locate at a− 1 or c + 1 and
the remaining players at a− 1 if r is to the right and at c+ 1 if r is to the left. Thus
at t+ 2, no player locates further away than max{−a− 2, d+ 2}.
When exactly one player relocates at random, each player is chosen to be the
one who does with probability 1
4
. His probability of being on the right/left side
respectively is 1
2
.
Let us show that the probability of entering A is at least 1
8
, in other words there
is at least one player whose random relocation leads to BR in A. Let a, b, c, d be (one
of) the best replies without random relocation at time t+1. Note that now (a, b, c, d)
is the configuration we reach by best replies (in the absence of random relocations)
and not as before the configuration we start from. It is obvious that if at least
three players are on the same side it is sufficient to relocate the last one. Therefore
suppose a ≤ b < 0 ≤ c ≤ d. Suppose first that d(a,M) ≤ d(d,M) (without loss of
generality). Relocate the player whose deterministic best reply was c to the right of
d (such a relocation occurs with probability 1
8
), so that the best reply with random
relocation is BRt+1 = (a, b, d, r). Since r >> d, BRt+2 = ((a − 1) ∗ 3, b − 1) ∈ A.
It is now sufficient to note that whenever we are in A
⋂
I, if no random relocation
occurs, we reach a configuration of the form x¯ ∈ I in two steps. Therefore, if we
reach a state in A
⋂
I in two or three steps starting from ω, we reach a configuration
of the form x¯ ∈ I in four or five steps. 
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Proof: (of Lemma 6) Suppose without loss of generality that x < M . If a random
relocation outside I occurs, the configuration can be (r, x∗3) and then BR = x+ 1.
Given that this is the only random relocation in l periods, best replies take us into
[M−3,M+3] within l periods. If the configuration with random location is (x∗3, r),
r > M , then BR = ((x − 1) ∗ 3, x + 1), and since all players are on the same side,
again best replies take us into [M − 3,M + 3] within l periods. 
Proof: (of Lemma 7) Consider without loss of generality ω = ((M − a) ∗
3, (M + a − 1)) (the other case is similar by symetry). If the player who is alone
is randomly relocated outside of I, if it is on the right we are done because all
players are on the same side. This choice has probability 1
8
, as each player is
chosen with probability 1
4
, and a location on the right is chosen with probability
1
2
. If it is on the left, the configuration with random relocation is (r, (M − a) ∗ 3)
and BRt = (M − a − 1, (M − a + 1) ∗ 3) ∈ A⋂ I. If one of the three players
on the same side relocates at random on the left, the configuration with random
relocation is (r, (M − a) ∗ 2,M + a− 1) and BRt = (M − a+ 1, (M + a) ∗ 3) ∈ Ωl/2AC .
If one of the three players on the same side relocates at random on the right,
the configuration with random relocation is ((M − a) ∗ 2, (M + a − 1), r), hence
BRt = ((M − a− 1) ∗ 3, (M + a)) ∈ ΩAC . Note that we are not necessarily in Ωl/2AC
because we have moved to an absorbing state one step farther from the center. 
Proof: (of Lemma 8) Consider the probability of returning to S from a state in
Ω
l/2
AC . This probability is minimized when ω = {(M−a)∗3,M+a−1)} with a = l/2,
the state in S that is the farthest from the center. Let q be the probability that
exactly one random relocation occurs and that it leads to {(M−a−1)∗3, (M+a)}.
With probability 1 − q − O(2) we return to S. With probability q = O() we are
in {(M − a − 1) ∗ 3, (M + a)}, an absorbing class that is neither in S nor in IC .
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From this class, we can reach IC in two ways. Either by gradually moving from one
absorbing class to another one step farther from the center, i. e. repeating l/2 times
case 3 in Lemma 7, or we can exit rapidly because of ‘atypical’ random relocations.
Consider the sequence of random variables drawn at times t, ...t+ L, where t is the
date of entry in ((M − a− 1) ∗ 3, (M + a)) and L =: l4

. Let us define three events
E1, E2, E3 such that if these three events are realized we return to S.
• E1: Let Ak be the event that there is no random relocation in I at date t+ k
or t + k + 1, and at most one random relocation in IC (either at t + k or at
t+ k + 1 but not both), and let E1 be the event
⋂k=L−1
k=1 Ak).
• E2 is the event that there are at least O(l) random relocations in IC .
• E3 is the event that at least one random relocation in IC leads to a state x¯ ∈ I.
If the three events above are realized, we return to S. Consequently the
probability that we do not return to S is bounded by P (EC1
⋃
EC2
⋃
EC3 ) ≤
P (EC1 ) + P ((E
C
2
⋃
EC3 )).
We begin by bounding P (E1). At each date, the probability that there is no
random relocation is (1 − )4 =: 1 − pi, with pi = 4 + O(2N). The probability
that exactly one random relocation occurs at a given date is q =: 4(1 − )3 =
4 + O(2). The probability that the required property is satisified by A1 is
thus (1 − pi)2 + 2(1 − pi)q(N − l)/N = 1 − O( l
N
). Either we have no random
relocations in A1 or there is a random relocation outside of I at one of the dates
and no random relocation at the other date. The probability that Ak satisfies
the property is not independent of the probability that it is satisfied by Ak−1
since there is one date in common. However the probability P (
⋂k=L−1
k=1 Ak) =∏k=L−1
k=2 P (Ak|Ak−1)P (A1). The conditional probability P (Ak|Ak−1) is not smaller
than P (Ak). Indeed the dependence occurs through the common location k and the
probability of a random relocation at this date is lower conditioning on Ak−1. We
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have P (
⋂k=L−1
k=1 Ak) ≥ (1−O( lN ))L = (1−O( lN ))(
N
l
)( l
5
N) = exp−O( l5
N
) = 1−O( l5
N
).
Thus P (EC1 ) = O(
l5
N
) < O( 1
l2
) since limN→∞ l
7
N
= 0.
Next, we prove that with high probability the number of random relocations in
IC is approximately L, their expected value. The number of periods at which we
obtain random relocations is given by a binomial random variable Bin(q, L). This
variable has mean qL = O(l4) and standard deviation σ =
√
Lq(1− q) = O(l2). By
the Chebycheff inequality, the probability P (|Bin(q, L) − qL| ≥ kσ) ≤ 1
k2
. Taking
for example k = l, with probability at least 1− 1
l2
, the number of random relocations
is O(l4). Thus, P (E2) ≥ 1− 1l2 .
Finally, each time a random relocation occurs, it is such that we enter A with
probability p = 1
8
, and if no random relocation occurs in the next two steps,
which has a probability close to 1, we then reach x¯ ∈ I. Consequently, at each
random relocation, the probability of not reaching x¯ ∈ I is smaller than, say, 8
9
.
If we condition on the fact that there are O(l4) random relocations in IC , the
probability that none leads to x¯ ∈ I is P (EC3 |E2) = (89)O(l
4) < O(2) (as a result of
Condition 1). Therefore P ((EC2
⋃
EC3 )) = 1− P (E2
⋂
E3) = 1− P (E3|E2)P (E2) =
1− [1− P (EC3 |E2)]P (E2) ≤ 1− [1−O(2)](1− 1l2 ) = O( 1l2 )
Thus, we conclude that P (EC1
⋃
EC2
⋃
EC3 ) = O(
1
l2
). Since the probability of
entering ((M − a− 1) ∗ 3, (M + a)) instead of returning to S immediately is q, the
probability of not returning to S is O( q
l2
) = O( 
l2
). 
B.2 Lemma 9
Proof: The proof is based on a number of lemmas dealing with all possible cases
of configurations in AC .
The first lemma deals with configurations where three players are on the same
side:
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Lemma 10 Suppose that ω is a configuration such that a ≤ b ≤ c < M < d. Then
either BR(ω) is a configuration such that a ≤ b < M < c ≤ d, or a single random
relocation will place BR(ω) in A.
Proof: Indeed, suppose that the deterministic best replies place three players on
the same side, it is then sufficient to relocate at random the last player. If he is
relocated on the same side as the others, which occurs with probability 1
2
, we are in
A. 
Therefore, from now on, we restrict attention to configurations with two players
on each side of the center: a ≤ b < M < c ≤ d.
In Lemma 11 below, we consider the case where both endpoints of the
configuration are close to the center so that no player has an interior best reply.
Lemma 11 Suppose that max {d(a,M), d(d,M)} < N
4
, then the set A is reached
within at most two steps with a probability at least equal to c1, where c1 is a constant
independent of N.
Proof: If max {d(a,M), d(d,M)} < N
4
, the interior players prefer to relocate at
the endpoints. We have a ≤ b < M < c ≤ d, and d(d,M) ≤ d(a,M) (without loss
of generality), then with probability at least 1
4
both interior players locate at d+ 1,
and the player at d locates at c+ 1. It is sufficient to randomly relocate the player
at a on the right side to be in A. 
When the endpoints of a configuration are far from the center, best replies can
be interior. We summarize some useful properties of interior best replies. We denote
by U[a,b] a discrete uniform law on the set of locations strictly between a and b.
Property 1
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• If the players at a or d prefer an interior location it is given by U[b,c]
• If the player at b has an interior best reply, it is given by the uniform random
variable U[a,c] or U[c,d]
• If the player at c has an interior best reply, it is given by the uniform random
variable U[b,d] or U[a,b]
• If the best reply of the player at b is U[c,d], the best reply of the player at c is
U[b,d]
• If the best reply of the player at c is U[a,b], the best reply of the player at a is
U[a,c]
Lemma 12 Suppose that U ∈ {U[a,c], U[b,c], U[b,d], U[c,d], U[a,b]} is an interior best reply
of some player, then P (d(U,M) < N
4
) ≥ c2, where c2 > 0 is a constant independent
of N.
Proof: For uniform variables on the intervals [a, c], [b, c] and [b, d], the result is
obvious since these intervals contain M . For example [a, c] = [a,M ]
⋃
(M, c] and at
least one of the two intervals must have a strictly positie probability to make [a, c]
a best reply, and similarly for [b, c] and [b, d]. Let us show that the best reply U[c,d]
(and similarly U[a,b] by symetry ) can only occur if d(c,M) ≤ [14 − K]N , implying
P (d(U[c,d],M) <
N
4
) ≥ K. If d(c,M) > [1
4
− K]N , the utility of location U[c,d] is
inferior to N/8 + KN , but then if d(a,M) < N
4
, the player at b prefers location
a−1, which gives a utility of at least N
4
. And if d(a,M) > N
4
, he prefers U[a,c] which
provides a utility superior to N
4
−KN (with K assumed small but positive). Thus,
U[c,d] cannot be a best reply. 
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Lemma 13 Let c3 =
1
10
. If d(b,M) > kN and d(c,M) > c3N , then any
configuration ω where at least one player has an interior best reply reaches A with
a single random relocation.
Proof: Suppose at least one player has an interior best reply U ∈
{U[a,c], U[b,c], U[b,d]}. By the assumptions, P (U > M) > 110 and P (U < M) > 110 .
Such a player can end up on any side of the center with positive probability. If
one of the remaining three players is alone on his side, it suffices to relocate him
at random. We note that by Property 1, if the interior reply (of player b) is U[c,d] ,
then the best reply of the player at c is U[b,d], and similarly if the interior reply (of
player c) is U[a,b] then that of player b is U[a,c]. 
The cases that were not covered by Lemma 13 are covered by Lemma 14.
Lemma 14 If d(b,M) ≤ c3N or d(c,M) ≤ c3N , where c3 = 110 , then any
configuration ω reaches A in at most three steps involving a single random relocation.
Proof: Suppose without loss of generality d(b,M) ≤ d(c,M).
(i) Suppose d(a,M) > N
4
and d(d,M) < N
4
. Since the point d+1 ≤ N
4
is available,
no player locates at a−1. If some player has an interior best reply, by lemma 12,
the realized location is closer than N
4
to the center with probability at least 1
4
,
and we reach a configuration where both endpoints are inferior to N
4
, a case
already treated in Lemma 11.
(ii) The case d(a,M) < N
4
and d(d,M) > N
4
is the same as the one above, by
symmetry, since the positions of b and d did not intervene in the argument
above.
(iii) Suppose d(a,M) > N
4
and d(d,M) > N
4
.
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(a) If d(b,M) ≤ d(c,M) < c3N , then the best replies are b− 1, c+ 1 and the
interior players either locate at the smallest endpoint or in the interior.
In both cases, with positive probability, the smallest endpoint in BRt(ω)
is closer than N
4
to the center, and we are in one of the cases considered
above.
(b) Suppose d(c,M) ≥ c3N , and d(a,M) > d(d,M). If the best reply of the
player at b is U[a,c], he has positive probability of ending up on either side.
We can then apply the argument in the proof of Lemma 13: at least two
of the other players locate on the same side. Relocate the remaining one
on this side. Thus suppose the player at b locates at d+1 or at U[c,d]. The
players at c and d locate on the right with positive probability.22 The
player at a relocates at b− 1. It is sufficient to relocate the player whose
best reply is b− 1 on the right side.
(c) Suppose d(c,M) ≥ c3N , and d(a,M) ≤ d(d,M). If the best reply of the
player at b is U[a,c], he has positive probability of ending up on either
side, and we are done by the argument in the proof of Lemma 13. Thus,
suppose the player at b locates at a − 1 or U[c,d] and the player at a
relocates at b − 1. Note that d(c,M) < N/5, because otherwise the
player at b would prefer the interval [a, c]. The possible locations to the
right of c are U[b,d] and U[c,d] but P (d(U[c,d],M) <
N
4
) ≥ N/4−N/5
d−c . With
positive probability, we reach a configuration whose rightmost endpoint
is smaller than N
4
, a case that has been analyzed before.

Combining Lemma 10 to 14 proves Lemma 9. 
22Indeed U[a,b] is not a best reply for the player at c if U[a,c] is not a best reply for the player at
b.
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